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There is currently considerable concern with US capacity to muster the acquired number of sealift 
vessels needed to swiftly deploy forces overseas. Norway for its part has a large, modern, and versatile 
merchant fleet that could be militarily useful in case of NATO operations to reinforce Europe. This brief 
suggest a bilateral agreement be signed between Norway and the US that obliges Norway to muster a 
significant number of Norwegian-controlled ships to support transatlantic US sealift operations. Norway, 
along with most other European NATO member states, relies on US reinforcements for its national 
security. These reinforcements arrive by sea. Therefore, an agreement such as the one suggested in this 
brief serves the security interests of the US, Norway, and the rest of the European NATO states.    
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							 										 																																																																																																																																
												 																																						
The	research	project	“Revitalizing	Transatlantic	Maritime	Security:	Filling	Capability	Gaps	with	the	Norwegian	Commercial	Shipping	Sector”	intends	to	bring	forward	creative	ideas	on	how	to	fill	logistical	gaps	by	leveraging	private-public	partnerships	with	merchant	fleet	operators. The	 project	 is	 a	 collaboration	 between	 Center	 for	 New	 American	 Security,	Norwegian	 Institiute	of	 International	Affairs	and	 the	Royal	Norwegian	Naval	Academy.	The	project	is	funded	by	a	research	grant	provided	by	the	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence.		
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The	United	States	has	long	had	a	unique	capability	to	 project	 power	 around	 the	 world	 by	 rapidly	deploying	military	forces.	Strategic	sealift	is	key	to	this	 capability,	 as	 more	 than	 90	 percent	 of	 US	military	 equipment	 and	 supplies	 travel	 by	 sea.1	There	is,	however,	concern	that	the	US	in	the	near	future	will	not	be	able	to	supply	a	sustained	conflict	overseas	 due	 to	 a	 shrinking	 sealift	 capacity.	According	to	General	Stephen	Lyons,	Commander	of	US	Transportation	Command	 (USTRANSCOM),	 the	sealift	fleet	currently	can	generate	only	65	percent	of	the	Department	of	Defense’s	required	capacity.2	The	US	is,	in	other	words,	not	able	to	self-reliantly	meet	its	sealift	requirements.	Consequently,	unless	short-term	solutions	can	be	found,	the	Joint	Forces	Command	 may	 have	 to	 make	 harsh	 priorities	concerning	where	 to	deploy	 forces	 in	 the	event	of	two	coinciding	wars.		This	shortage	of	sealift	capacity	comes	at	a	difficult	 time.	 The	 current	multipolar	world	 order	presents	 a	 range	 of	 challenges	 to	 NATO,	 both	internal	 and	 external.	 China	 and	 Russia	 are	dissatisfied	with	continued	Western	dominance	and	seek	 to	 alter	 the	 long-standing	 power	 balance,	 in	both	 economic	 and	 military	 terms.	 In	 a	 broader	perspective,	 inadequate	 US	 sealift	 capacity	 may	negatively	 affect	 US	 deterrence	 and	 influence.	 US	adversaries	are	also	aware	of	how	sealift	shortages	affect	 US	military	 readiness	 and	 ability	 to	 deploy	overseas,	 which	 may	 in	 fact	 have	 the	 effect	 of	lowering	the	armed	conflict	threshold.			
Many outside this committee are 
unaware that in a major 
contingency, the United States 
Army sails to the fight.  
Lt Gen Stephen R. Lyons,                      
Commander USTRANSCOM 	In	 a	 situation	 where	 long-lasting	 power	balances	 are	 changing	 to	 form	 a	 more	 complex	international	 scene,	 NATO	 remains	 the	 backbone	for	the	security	of	most	of	its	member	states.	Recent	US	 calls	 for	 increased	burden	 sharing	have	meant	that	 several	 countries	 are	 in	 the	 process	 of	increasing	 their	 defense	 spending.	 However,	building	 defense	 capabilities	 and	 capacities	 is	 an	extremely	 expensive,	 politically	 difficult,	 and	 slow	endeavor.	 Norway,	 a	 country	 with	 very	 limited	military	 capabilities,	 should	 identify	 ways	 to	
contribute	to	 the	military	muscle	of	NATO	that	do	not	 cripple	 the	 country’s	military	 presence	 in	 the	North.	 Striking	 that	 balance	 should,	 however,	 not	mean	reducing	support	 for	the	alliance—quite	the	contrary.	This	brief	proposes	a	way	that	Norway	can	contribute	 to	 US	 military	 readiness	 and	sustainment	 without	 waiting	 for	 new	 military	investments	to	take	effect,	as	well	as	in	ways	that	do	not	 cripple	 military	 presence	 at	 home.3	 By	 using	ships	from	the	Norwegian	merchant	fleet,	arguably	Norway’s	 greatest	 international	 asset,	 Norway	could	 provide	 a	 short-term	 fix	 to	 pressing	 US	military	 requirements	 for	 strategic	 sealift.	 Such	 a	solution	would	give	 the	USTRANSCOM	access	 to	a	given	 number	 of	 fully	 manned	 modern	 transport	vessels	in	the	event	of	a	NATO	mobilization.	Due	to	already	 established	 readiness	 arrangements,	Norwegian	 merchant	 ships	 would	 be	 able	 to	contribute	 substantially	 to	 US	 surge	 capacity	 and	the	 corresponding	 agility	 of	 the	 US	 military.	 In	addition,	and	if	needed,	Norwegian	ships	could	also	add	sustainment	capacity	by	supplementing	the	US	commercial	 sustainment	 fleet.	 Furthermore,	 the	arrangement	 suggested	 in	 this	 paper	 would	facilitate	 the	 reception	 of	 US	 reinforcements	 to	Europe	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 military	 confrontation	corresponding	with	Article	V,	 thus	contributing	 to	the	Alliance’s	collective	defense,	not	 just	to	that	of	the	involved	parties.		
The US Need for Increased Sealift Capacity US	sealift	arrangements	consist	of	a	surge	fleet	and	a	sustainment	fleet	taken-up	from	trade.	The	surge	fleet	is	a	largely	state-owned	fleet	of	ships	that	are	strategically	 located,	 and	 which	 have	 a	 high	readiness	 to	 quickly	 provide	 the	 USTRANSCOM	with	transport	capacity	should	the	need	arise.	After	the	 initial	 surge	 phase,	 and	 as	 soon	 as	 it	 can	 be	mobilized,	 the	 commercial	 sustainment	 fleet	 is	 to	take	over.	These	ships	are	on	call,	which	means	that	when	 not	 needed	 by	 the	 DoD,	 they	 are	 in	commercial	service	around	the	globe.		For	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 years,	 several	 US	departments	and	naval	authorities	have	repeatedly	called	for	the	strengthening	of	both	the	state-owned	surge	 fleet	 and	 the	 commercial	 sustainment	 fleet.	The	first	category	consists	of	15	vessels	belonging	to	 the	 Military	 Sealift	 Command	 as	 well	 as	 a	dedicated	 surge	 sealift	 fleet	 named	 the	 Ready	Reserve	 Force	 (RRF),	 owned	 and	 maintained	 by	MARAD,	 an	 agency	 within	 the	 Department	 of	
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Transportation.	The	RRF	fleet	numbers	46	vessels.	The	 15	 MSC	 ships	 are	 all	 Roll-on	 Roll-off	 (RoRo)	ships	 and	 are	 on	 average	 30	 years	 of	 age.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 RRF	 ships	 (35	 of	 them)	 are	 also	RoRo,	but	there	are	also	11	special	capability	ships	(e.g.,	dry	cargo	ships	fit	for	transporting	munitions)	in	the	fleet.		While	the	RRF	consists	of	a	decent	number	of	ships,	the	readiness	of	the	fleet	is	limited	by	the	age	of	the	ships.	The	average	age	of	the	RRF	ships	is	44	years,	which	also	means	that	most	of	 them	are	technologically	 outdated.	 About	 one-half	 of	 them	are	in	fact	steam	turbine	ships.	The	high	age	and	the	outdated	 technology	of	 the	RRF	 fleet	 in	particular	results	 in	 increases	 in	 degraded	 or	 out-of-service	equipment	 and	 maintenance	 periods	 that	 run	longer	than	planned.4	The	material	condition	of	the	ships	in	turn	affects	the	ability	of	surge	sealift	ships	to	become	operational	within	the	five-day	limit	set	for	the	RFF	ships.			
	
An ADM Callaghan Class RoRo belonging to the RRF fleet. The ship 
was built in 1967. Photo: MARAD Ship Characteristics Pamphlet 
2016. 	The	commercial	sustainment	fleet,	which	is	to	 take	 over	 after	 the	 initial	 surge	 phase,	 is	 both	newer	and	 in	better	 shape	compared	 to	 the	 surge	fleet.5	 These	 ships	 are	 enrolled	 in	 the	 Maritime	Security	Program	(MSP),	which	provides	a	stipend	to	counterbalance	the	cost	of	operating	under	a	US	flag	relative	to	a	foreign	flag.6	The	number	of	MSP	ships	is,	however,	too	low	to	meet	the	demand	in	a	major	war,	and	there	is	limited	room	for	scaling	up	the	 program	 by	 recruiting	 new	 ships	 from	 the	ocean-going	 merchant	 fleet.	 The	 recruitment	problem	 relates	 to	 a	 limited	 pool	 of	 both	 suitable	ships	and	trained	mariners.	As	of	2018,	the	number	of	 ocean-going	 US-flagged	 commercial	 vessels	(1000	gross	tons	or	more)	engaged	in	international	
trade	was	82,	 60	of	which	are	 already	part	 of	 the	MSP	program.7		The	 small	 number	 of	 merchant	 ships	 also	makes	for	a	limited	pool	of	trained	mariners	eligible	for	 recruitment.	 The	 problem	 is	 especially	 acute	concerning	 the	 state-owned	RRF	 fleet.	 Few	young	mariners	have	the	necessary	certificates	to	operate	the	 RRF	 ships,	 as	 they	 require	 steam	 technology	competency	 as	 well	 as	 marine	 engineering	certificates.	 The	 same	 problem	 also	 applies	 to	maintainers.			
	
American RoRo Carriers’ M/V Independence II loads military 
vehicles and heavy equipment after the NATO exercise Trident 
Juncture, December 6, 2018, Borg Harbor, Norway.  Photo: Å.G. 
Østensen.		 Adding	 to	 the	 shortage	 of	 competent	mariners,	the	deployment	of	the	RRF	fleet	relies	on	the	 same	 pool	 of	 mariners	 as	 the	 commercial	sustainment	fleet.	The	RRF	fleet	is	sparsely	manned	on	 a	 day-to-day	 basis	 and	 relies	 on	 crews	 to	 be	scrambled	 from	 the	 rotating	 crew	 of	 the	 MSP	vessels	 in	 the	 event	 of	 RFF	 activation.8	 In	 such	 a	situation,	this	would	mean	that	most	of	the	60	MSP	ships	would	be	short	of	one	crew.	Unless	 the	ship	has	three	crews,	the	one	remaining	crew	would	not	be	 able	 to	 rotate	 off	 duty	 unless	 the	 MSP	 fleet	shippers	can	find	replacements	on	their	own.	Crew	shortages	would	quickly	degrade	the	effectiveness	of	 the	 ships	 and	 potentially	 result	 in	 delayed	deployments.	 One	 study	 estimated	 that	 in	 a	 best-case	scenario,	the	US	would	be	short	1800	qualified	mariners	 to	 crew	 the	 ships	 earmarked	 for	 surge	sealift	 (the	 46	 RRF	 ships	 and	 15-16	 state	 owned	MSC	vessels)	during	the	first	four	to	six	months	of	a	surge.	This	number	is	also	somewhat	optimistic,	as	it	would	require	zero	losses,	all	eligible	mariners	to	volunteer	 for	 service,	 and	would	 not	 allow	 crews	rotating	off	duty.9	Realistically,	if	war	broke	out,	the	shortage	is	likely	to	be	considerably	higher.		In	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 years,	 MARAD	 and	USTRANSCOM	have	repeatedly	voiced	concern	with	inadequate	 US	 sealift	 capacity.	 The	 surge	 sealift	
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situation	is	particularly	acute.	The	readiness	of	the	surge	 sealift	 fleet	 has	 trended	 downward	 several	years	 in	 a	 row,	with	 a	particularly	 steep	decrease	since	 2015.10	 This	 limits	 the	 amount	 of	 military	cargo	 that	 can	 be	 moved	 to	 reinforce	 Europe,	especially	if	the	US	is	engaged	on	two	fronts.	It	also	negatively	 affects	 the	 credibility	 of	 US	 military	readiness.	Thus,	it	is	in	Europe’s	interest	to	look	for	ways	 to	 augment	 the	 surge	 capability	 of	 US	assistance,	 assistance	 that	 is	 often	 assumed	 to	depend	on	political	will	only—or	worse	yet,	is	taken	for	granted.		
What does Norway Have to Offer, and Why 
Would It Be Relevant? The	 Norwegian	 merchant	 fleet	 is	 large	 in	deadweight	 tons,	 value,	 and	 number	 of	 ships.	 Per	January	1,	2019,	the	Norwegian-controlled	foreign-going	 fleet	 numbered	 1787	 ships.11	 In	 contrast	 to	the	 shrinking	 US	 merchant	 fleet,	 the	 size	 of	 the	Norwegian	 fleet	 is	 growing.	 Through	 2017	 and	2018,	the	fleet	has	grown	by	71	vessels,	with	over	eight	 percent	 measured	 in	 deadweight	 tonnage.12	The	fleet	ranks	number	five	in	the	world	in	terms	of	value,	 due	 in	 large	 part	 to	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	relatively	 new	 and	 technologically	 advanced	offshore	ships.		As	 tends	 to	 be	 the	 case	 in	 many	Western	countries,	 a	 considerable	 share	 of	 the	 merchant	fleet	flies	convenience	flags.	This	goes	for	about	55	percent	 of	 the	 Norwegian-controlled	 merchant	ships,	 a	 percentage	 which	 is	 below	 the	 world	average,	but	which	still	could	create	some	obstacles	in	the	event	of	a	contingency	due	to	US	regulations.	The	 Norwegian	 reflagging	 process	 is,	 however,	relatively	uncomplicated	and	fast.	According	to	the	Norwegian	 Shipowners’	 Association	 (NSA),	 the	process	can	in	theory	be	completed	in	less	than	24	hours,	but	in	practice	the	process	often	takes	up	to	a	couple	of	weeks	due	to	banking	procedures.	Given	the	fact	that	all	1787	ships	are	included	in	national	public–private	 readiness	 arrangements,	 this	analysis	 of	 what	 Norway	 has	 to	 offer	 includes	 all	foreign-going	Norwegian	controlled-ships.		The	 largest	 portion	 of	 the	 Norwegian-controlled	 ocean-going	 fleet	 is	 offshore	 service	ships.	 However,	 the	 fleet	 also	 includes	 a	 large	number	of	ships	that	would	be	highly	relevant	 for	sealift	 purposes.	 The	 Norwegian	 merchant	 fleet	includes	 a	 considerable	 fleet	 of	 commercial	 RoRo	vessels	 and	 a	 large	 fleet	 of	 chemical/product	tankers	suitable	for	transporting	high-grade	fuel.	It	
also	includes	a	small	number	of	container	ships	and	a	 fair	number	of	dry	cargo	ships	of	all	shapes	and	sizes.	This	study	will	focus	on	RoRos	and	tankers,	as	they	 are	 not	 only	 key	 components	 of	 sealift	capability	but	also	assets	that	Norway	can	provide	in	 decent	 numbers.	 Tankers	 enable	 sealift	 of	 fuel,	while	RoRos	with	flexible	decks	enable	sealift	of	a	wide	variety	of	military	goods	and	equipment,	such	as	 vehicles	 and	 heavy	 machinery	 necessary	 for	combat	operations	and	base	construction.	Still,	 other	 ship	 types	 are	 also	 relevant	 for	this	proposal.	A	quick	look	at	the	surge	sealift	fleet	reveals	that	special	purpose	ships	are	old	and	need	replacement.	 The	 aviation	 support	 ships	 and	auxiliary	 crane	 ships	 are	 particularly	 old.	 These	ships	will	reach	50	to	55	years	of	age	by	2024,	which	is	their	programmed	service	life.	Both	the	Army	and	the	Marine	Corps	rely	on	these	ships.13	Norway	has	a	large	fleet	of	offshore	special	purpose	ships	ideal	for	 heavy	 lifting	 and	 complicated	 support	operations	 in	 rough	 conditions.	 This	 means	 that	there	 is	 plenty	 of	 room	 for	 maneuvering	 should	Norwegian	 authorities	 consider	 offering	maritime	assets	in	support	of	its	main	ally.					
RoRo Ships Informed	by	the	US	National	Military	Strategy,	the	US	 DoD	 has	 estimated	 that	 it	 requires	 91	 RoRo	vessels	or	the	equivalent	of	20	million	square	feet	of	RoRo	capacity.	With	the	current	age-out	rates	of	the	Rapid	Response	Force,	the	USTRANSCOM	estimates	that	 it	will	 lose	capacity	equaling	4	million	square	feet	by	2030,	and	an	additional	5	million	square	feet	by	2040.14		Norwegian	 ship-owning	 companies	 are	heavily	invested	in	the	RoRo	segment.	There	are	at	least	 136	 large	 RoRo	 ships	 in	 the	 Norwegian-controlled	fleet,	and	shipping	companies	like	Höegh	Autoliners	 and	Wilhelmsen	 Group	 are	 among	 the	world	 leaders	 within	 large-	 and	 medium-sized	ocean-going	 RoRo	 vessels.	 In	 December	 2018,	Norwegian/Swedish	 Wallenius-Wilhelmsen	represented	22	percent	 of	 the	world’s	RoRo	 fleet.	Höegh,	for	its	part,	owns	and	operates	about	50	car	carriers,	 among	 them	several	 that	 are	 suitable	 for	“high	 and	heavy”	 transport,	meaning	 construction	equipment	and	large	rolling	and	non-rolling	stock,	such	as	military	vehicles	and	equipment.			Large	 RoRo	 vessels	 usually	 transit	 fixed	trade	routes,	some	of	which	connect	the	US	Gulf	and	East	 Coast	 with	 main	 ports	 in	 Europe.	Regarding	readiness	 and	 availability,	 ships	 that	 already	operate	 transatlantic	 routes	would	be	particularly	
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well	 suited	 for	 readiness	 agreements	 like	 the	 one	suggested	 in	 this	 brief.	 Mixing	 military	 and	commercial	cargo	is	key	to	the	MSP	concept,	and	in	the	event	of	an	emergency,	a	RoRo	could	unload	its	cargo	in	many	large	harbors	to	free	up	space,	or	use	spare	 capacity	 to	 carry	 military	 equipment.	According	 to	 a	 central	 industry	 representative,	within	24	hours	of	notice,	Norway	could	muster	at	least	one	large	RoRo	vessel	ready	to	load	on	the	US	East	Coast.	Transit	time	would	be	about	two	weeks,	leaving	 the	 total	 time	 spent	 from	 when	 notice	 is	given	to	the	ship	docks	in	Northern	Europe	to	less	than	three	weeks.			
	
Sea-Cargo’s M/V SC Connector, a 155-meter long RoRo with a 
capacity of 9000 dt. Photo: Sea-Cargo. 	 In	addition	to	the	large	car	carriers,	several	Norwegian	 shipping	 companies	 specialize	 in	smaller	 RoRo	 ships	 and	 multipurpose	 ships,	 e.g.,	Sea-Cargo	 and	 SeaTrans.	 Smaller	 RoRo	 vessels	could	be	highly	favorable	for	distributing	goods	and	vehicles	 locally	 or	 regionally	 within	 Europe.	 A	combination	 of	 large	 RoRos	 for	 transatlantic	passage	 to,	 e.g.,	 Scotland,	 with	 smaller	 ones	redistributing	equipment	to	smaller	ports	closer	to	the	 deployed	 troops	 could	 be	 beneficial.	 Using	smaller	vessels	would	contribute	 to	 reducing	risk,	as	each	vessel	would	carry	less	cargo	and	hence	be	less	 valuable	 targets.	 Smaller	 ships	would	 also	 be	more	flexible	in	terms	of	the	choice	of	passage	and	ports,	which	would	reduce	predictability	in	the	face	of	an	enemy.				
Chemical tankers and product tanker capacity Norwegian	shippers	own	a	large	number	of	tankers	within	 different	 segments	 (crude,	 product,	 and	chemical).	 Both	 product	 tankers	 and	 chemical	tankers	are	relevant	to	this	suggestion,	but	chemical	tankers	 are	 the	 most	 versatile.	 Modern	 chemical	tankers	have	a	large	number	of	tanks,	some	up	to	50	
tanks,	 and	 each	 can	be	 loaded	with	 very	different	products.	This	means	that	this	type	of	tanker	would	not	necessarily	need	to	unload	all	of	its	cargo	before	loading	 fuel	 in	 vacant	 tanks.	 Product	 tankers	 also	have	several	separate	tanks	coated	on	the	inside	to	limit	 pollution	 from	 past	 cargo.	 Although	 these	ships	usually	have	a	lower	number	of	tanks	and	may	be	 unfit	 for	 jet	 fuel,	 their	 tanks	 are	 usually	 larger	than	those	of	chemical	tankers.	Pumps	unload	tanks	separately,	meaning	free	capacity	can	be	used	even	if	some	of	the	tanks	are	already	loaded.		Norway	 ranks	 number	 one	 in	 terms	 of	chemical	 tanker	 operators	 in	 the	 world.	 The	 two	largest	companies	are	both	Norwegian	(Odfjell	and	Stolt-Nielsen).	 Looking	 at	 the	 top	 30	 tanker	companies	 globally,	 six	Norwegian	operators	hold	25	 percent	 of	 the	world’s	 chemical	 tanker	 fleet.15	According	 to	 numbers	 acquired	 from	 the	Norwegian	 Shipowners’	 Association,	 there	 are	about	 239	 chemical	 tankers	 in	 the	 Norwegian-controlled	foreign-going	fleet	as	well	as	78	“other	oil	tankers.”16	 What	 characterizes	 the	 Norwegian	controlled	tanker	fleet	is,	according	to	one	industry	actor,	that	the	fleet	is	technologically	very	advanced	and	 comparatively	 new,	 with	 the	 average	 age	 of	ships	 currently	 about	 10	 years.17	 The	 combined	tanker	 fleet	 further	 consists	 of	 large	 ocean-going	tankers	and	smaller	coastal	tankers,	which	could	be	used	 to	 redistribute	 fuel	 from	 larger	 ones.	 The	smaller	 tankers	would	 be	 particularly	well	 suited	for	narrow	waterways,	 e.g.,	 those	 found	along	 the	Norwegian	coastline.				
	
Odfjell’s M/V Bow Summer. A Norwegianflagged chemical tanker 
with 40 separate tanks. Photo: Odfjell 	Norwegian	 shipping	 companies	 also	 own	important	 infrastructure	 that	 could	 be	 of	 use.	 A	chemical	tanker	company	like	Bergen-based	Odfjell	Shipping,	for	instance,	operates	several	fixed	trade	routes,	among	them	a	trade	line	between	Houston	and	 Antwerp,	 where	 it	 owns	 seven	 terminals.18	Wilhelmsen	 Group	 has	 an	 extensive	 network	 of	
Concept Paper Series	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																	 	 							1/2019 
	
 
 
ã Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
6 
representatives	 around	 the	 globe,	with	 people	 on	the	ground	at	2200	port	locations	in	74	countries.19	Stolt-Nielsen	 also	 has	 the	 world’s	 largest	 fleet	 of	tank	 containers.	 These	 tanks	 are	 placed	 in	 a	shipping	 container-size	 steel	 frame	 (20	 ft),	 which	enables	 their	 handling	 and	 shipping	 as	 standard	containers.	 Accordingly,	 they	 can	 easily	 be	transferred	from	ship	to	rail	or	road.	Stolt-Nielsen	owns	35,000	such	containers,	which	corresponds	to	about	 10	 percent	 of	 the	 world	 total.	 These	containers	are	dispersed	in	a	global	network	of	21	depots	 operated	 by	 the	 company.20	 This	 type	 of	container	is	increasingly	used	for	military	purposes	to	 transport	 fuel	 and	 water	 to	 forward	 operating	bases,	 and	 even	 though	 there	 are	 tank	 containers	specifically	 fitted	 for	 military	 use,	 “civilian”	 tank	containers	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 great	 military	 value	and	use	in	case	of	large-scale	deployments.		
	
Tank container illustration photo 
	 In	the	event	of	a	war	between	major	powers,	securing	fuel	supply	is	key	to	all	branches	of	the	US	military.	 Sealift	 plays	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	providing	this	fuel.	A	series	of	DoD	mobility	studies	concluded	 in	 2016	 that	 the	 sealift	 requirement	 of	the	 DoD	 in	 terms	 of	 tankers	 is	 86	 vessels	 in	 a	planning	 scenario	 to	 sustain	 operations.21	 A	more	recent	 Center	 for	 Strategic	 and	 Budgetary	Assessments	 (CSBA)	 study	 suggests	 that	 the	requirement	may	in	fact	be	considerably	higher.	It	argues	 that	 the	 DoD	 calculations	 fail	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	 effects	 of	 attrition,	 as	 well	 as	 the	increased	 distribution	 of	 forces,	 and	 that	 the	number	 may	 not	 include	 the	 tankers	 used	 to	support	 the	 Navy.22	 Irrespective	 of	 whether	 the	correct	number	is	86	or	higher,	the	USTRANSCOM	is	very	 short	 in	 terms	 of	 tanker	 capacity.	 The	 Dry	Cargo	and	Tankers	Program	of	 the	Military	Sealift	Command	itself	has	only	six	tankers	at	its	disposal,	while	 the	RRF	has	only	one;	meanwhile,	 there	are	only	two	commercial	product	tankers	on	call	as	part	of	the	MSP.	In	total,	the	DoD	currently	has	a	total	of	
only	 nine	 vessels	 at	 its	 disposal	 for	 tanker	 sealift	purposes.	According	to	the	CSBA	study	referred	to	above,	 there	 are	 46	 militarily	 useful	 tankers	engaged	 in	 US	 domestic	 trade	 that	 could	 be	mobilized.	 However,	 even	 if	 all	 of	 these	 tankers	were	made	available	to	the	DoD	(which	would	have	negative	consequences	for	domestic	distribution	of	fuel),	there	would	still	be	a	gap	of	31	tankers.	There	are	currently	no	US-flagged	chemical	tankers	in	the	ocean-going	 merchant	 fleet.	 Table	 1	 sums	 up	 the	discrepancies	 between	 RoRo	 and	 tanker	requirements	 versus	 ships	 at	 disposal,	 surge	 and	sustainment	 fleets	 combined.	 The	 table	 includes	only	ships	currently	at	USTRANCOM’s	disposal.  
 
Table 1. US shortage of tankers and RoRo capacity23 
 
  RRF MSC MSP Total Required Shortage 
RoRo 35 10 18 63 91 28 
Tankers 1 6 2 9 86 77 	 A	major	war	 scenario	 in	 Europe,	 or	 in	 the	vicinity	of	Europe,	may	very	well	include	a	situation	where	 European	 fuel	 storage	 facilities	 and	refineries	 have	 been	 attacked	 or	 sabotaged,	increasing	 the	 need	 for	 flexible	 fuel	 transport	 in	order	to	secure	the	operability	of	European	military	assets.	While	governments	could	probably	scramble	some	fuel	tanker	capacity	from	the	spot	market	in	the	event	of	a	crisis,	a	better	option	would	be	to	have	preplanned	 arrangements	 in	 place	 that	 would	assure	 that	 suitable	 allied-controlled	 ships	 could	serve	the	needs	of	USTRANSCOM,	and	by	extension,	the	NATO	alliance.	It	should	be	noted	that	given	the	large	discrepancy	between	requirements	and	ships	at	disposal,	a	contingency	plan	involving	Norwegian	tankers	 would	 probably	 not	 cover	 the	 needs	entirely	in	a	major	war	scenario.	Still,	it	would	likely	be	a	very	useful	supplement	in	a	situation	of	armed	conflict.					
Advantages of a Norwegian Contingency 
versus Acquiring Ships from the Spot Market  As	 evident	 from	 the	 discrepancies	 between	 US	sealift	 requirements	 and	 the	 actual	 assets	 at	USTRANSCOM’s	 disposal,	 the	 US	 likely	 needs	 to	scramble	 additional	 ships	 from	 the	 commercial	market	in	case	of	major	deployments.	This	study	has	proposed	 a	 bilateral	 agreement	 though	 which	Norway	 supplies	 additional	 sealift	 capacity	 to	USTRANSCOM.	 In	 accordance	 with	 such	 an	
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agreement,	Norwegian	authorities	would	be	tasked	with	acquiring	an	agreed-upon	number	of	suitable	Norwegian-owned	ships	and	to	shoulder	the	costs,	or	at	least	share	the	costs.24		There	 are	 several	 advantages	 associated	with	such	a	bilateral	agreement,	besides	costs.	One	major	advantage	concerns	the	fact	that	Norwegian	authorities	 and	 shipowners	 already	 have	 a	 long-standing	mutual	understanding	that	shippers	have	a	role	to	play	in	national	emergencies.	Due	in	large	part	 to	 the	 long,	 varied,	 and	 deeply	 indented	coastline	of	Norway,	combined	with	a	mountainous	inland,	 the	 shipping	 sector	 is	 a	 key	 component	 in	Norwegian	total	defense	planning.	This	means	that	a	Norwegian	contribution	 to	US	sealift	 capacity	 in	the	event	of	a	crisis	involving	NATO	would	benefit	from	 a	 long-established	 and	 close	 collaboration	between	 government	 ministries	 (the	 Ministry	 of	Defense	and	the	Ministry	of	Trade,	Commerce	and	Fisheries)	 and	 the	 Norwegian	 Shipowners’	Association	 for	 readiness	 and	 crisis	 management.	The	NSA	thus	has	its	own	contingency	department,	one	which	greatly	facilitates	the	scrambling	of	ships	for	emergencies.		A	liaison	mechanism	called	NORTRASHIP	is	tasked	with	 facilitating	close	cooperation	between	the	 maritime	 sector	 and	 the	 Norwegian	government.	NORTRASHIP	consists	of	a	small	board	of	 members	 from	 the	 shippers,	 insurance,	 the	Norwegian	 Armed	 Forces,	 and	 governmental	ministries.	 In	 peacetime,	 this	 small	 cadre	 has	 an	advisory	function	only—but	in	case	of	a	major	war,	the	 board	 would	 be	 prepared	 to	 take	 on	 an	operational	 function	 on	 request	 from	 the	Norwegian	Government.	In	a	crisis	short	of	a	major	emergency,	 the	 Shipowners’	 Association	 would	handle	 requests	 for	 assistance	 coming	 from	 the	government.	 Emergency	 lines	 of	 communication	between	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Trade	 and	 Industry,	 the	Norwegian	 Armed	 Forces,	 and	 the	 Shipowners’	Association	 are	 designed	 primarily	 for	 a	 situation	where	Norway	is	under	attack.	Still,	the	Norwegian	Government	 uses	 these	 arrangements	 to	 solve	other	types	of	emergencies	as	well,	such	as	when	a	Norwegian	 seismic	 vessel	 was	 redirected	 to	evacuate	UN	and	diplomatic	personnel	from	Yemen	in	2015	on	request	from	the	World	Food	Program.25	DNK	issued	war	risk	insurance	within	an	hour,	and	the	 ship	 evacuated	 the	 personnel	 less	 than	 five	hours	after	the	alert.26			In	fact,	Norwegian	shippers	have	a	history	of	serving	NATO	countries	in	war.	During	World	War	II,	ships	requisitioned	by	the	government	made	an	
important	 contribution	 to	 the	 Allied	 fight	 against	the	 Axis	 powers.	 Specifically,	 the	 Norwegian	merchant	fleet	played	a	key	role	in	transporting	fuel	and	supplies	for	the	Allies	across	the	Atlantic.	The	tankers	 in	 particular	 have	 been	 described	 as	 “the	artery	of	the	Allied	fight	for	victory.”27	To	Winston	Churchill,	 “Norwegian	 seafarers	were	worth	more	than	 a	 million	 soldiers”	 according	 to	 some	sources.28	However,	the	fleet	sustained	high	losses.	About	3700	mariners	and	more	than	700	ships	were	lost	 serving	 the	 Allies.29	 This	 legacy	 arguably	 still	affects	 the	Norwegian	shipping	community,	which	to	a	large	extent	consists	of	family-owned	shipping	companies,	most	of	which	were	affected	by	World	War	 II	 hardships.	 As	 a	 result,	many	 shippers	 still	take	 pride	 in	 their	 company	 having	 served	 the	nation	and	the	Allies,	even	as	the	Norwegian	Armed	Forces	 had	 been	 forced	 to	 capitulate	 in	 Norway	proper.	The	Norwegian	shipping	community	is	thus	closely	associated	with	the	idea	of	a	Norwegian	total	defense,	meaning	the	mutual	support	of	the	civilian,	commercial,	 and	Armed	Forces	 in	 times	of	war.	A	common	 understanding,	 practical	 arrangements,	and	 importantly,	 the	 lack	 of	 red	 tape	 within	 the	existing	readiness	agreements	are	three	factors	that	could	 help	 facilitate	 a	 swift	 mustering	 of	commercial	 ships	 for	 a	US-led	 contingency	within	the	NATO	area.				
	
M/T Havbør, forming part of a Norwegian convoy, has been 
torpedoed in November 1940. Photo: Unknown  	 On	 several	 occasions,	 Norwegian	 shippers	have	 also	 been	 involved	 in	 US	military	 transport,	such	as	when	supporting	operations	in	Afghanistan	and	 during	 the	 first	 and	 second	 Gulf	 Wars.	Currently,	 the	 Wilhelmsen	 Group	 is	 heavily	involved	 in	 US	 sealift	 through	 its	 US	 subsidiary,	American	RoRo	Carriers	 (ARC).	ARC	currently	has	eight	large	US-flagged	RoRo	carriers	enrolled	in	the	Maritime	Security	Program.30		
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In	 a	 major	 powers	 war,	 other	 powers	outside	Western	ones	will	likely	also	seek	to	control	civilian	 shipping.	 The	 purpose	 could	 be	 to	 deny	Western	use	of	 this	auxiliary	capacity,	or	 to	use	 it	themselves.	When	 it	 comes	 to	 tankers,	 China	 and	Russia	comprise	a	growing	proportion	of	the	global	market.	 China	 in	 particular	 has	 grown	 quickly	 in	terms	of	shares	of	the	world	fleet	measured	in	dead	weight	tonnage.	In	the	event	of	a	major	power	war,	China	 and	 Russia	may	 want	 to	 exert	 pressure	 on	tanker	 operators	 (or	 operators	 of	 any	 important	maritime	 asset)	 not	 to	 cooperate	 with	 their	enemy.31	There	are	of	course	no	guarantees	that	no	Norwegian	shipper	would	be	pressured	or	tempted	to	sign	contracts	with	an	adversary	to	Norway.	Yet,	shippers	interviewed	for	this	study	pointed	out	that	in	the	event	of	war,	it	is	very	much	in	their	interest	to	 “be	 on	 the	 right	 side	 of	 history.”32	 This	means	they	would	likely	not	choose	short-term	profit	over	potential	reprisals	and	long-term	shaming.	It	would	also	 mean	 they	 would	 take	 measures	 to	 avoid	having	their	ships	seized	by	an	enemy	of	Norway	or	being	affected	by	wartime	regulations	of	their	flag	state	should	it	be	foreign	flagged.	A	quick	and	easy	reflagging	process	 is	 tailored	 to	meet	 the	demand	for	 Norwegian-owned	 vessels	 to	 reflag	 and	 avoid	such	situations	in	times	of	conflict.		By	 working	 with	 the	 Norwegian	 Shipping	Association	 and	 relying	 on	 this	 organization’s	 in-depth	 familiarity	with	 its	member	 companies,	 the	Norwegian	government	would	be	well	positioned	to	contract	 reliable	 industry	 actors	 compared	 to	 a	solution	 where	 the	 USTRANCOM	 would	 conduct	regular	 chartering	 through	 the	 spot	 market.	 For	instance,	 in	 a	 potential	 conflict	 with	 Russia,	 one	would	necessarily	want	to	avoid	using	Norwegian-owned	civilian	ships	with	Russian	crew	members.	Due	 to	 its	 intricate	 industry	 knowledge,	 the	Shipowners’	 Association	 representatives	 would	know	which	shipping	companies	to	avoid	in	the	first	place.	 A	 premediated	 agreement	 that	 places	 the	responsibility	 for	 acquiring	 a	 certain	 number	 of	additional	 sealift	 vessels	 on	 the	 Norwegian	Government	 is	 likely	 to	 reduce	 reaction	 time	significantly	as	opposed	to	USTRANSCOM	searching	the	global	market	for	militarily	useful	ships.	There	are	several	reasons	for	this.	First,	identifying	useful	ships	 is	 fast.	 The	 Shipowners’	 Association	 and	 its	mutual	insurance	partner,	Norwegian	Ship	Owners	Mutual	War	Risks	 Insurance	Association	 (DNK	 for	short),	 are	 co-located	 and	 control	 an	 advanced	operations	 room	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	 global	
situational	awareness.	Members	of	DNK	are	offered	free	 sensor	 technology	 (called	 Raptor),33	 which	enables	 two-way	 secure	 data	 connection	 with	 all	vessels	 worldwide.	 While	 intended	 to	 reduce	 the	need	for	reporting	calls	and	transits	through	areas	with	 higher	 premiums,	 it	 also	 arranges	 for	increased	 security	 for	 ships,	 as	 it	 provides	 both	ships	 and	 the	 DNK	 central	 updates	 every	 seven	minutes.	In	this	way,	the	DNK	operations	room	has	a	near	real-time	picture	of	all	the	2700	ships	under	its	 cover.	 Considering	 the	Norwegian	 ocean-going	fleet	 makes	 about	 80,000	 port	 calls	 around	 the	world	 every	 year,34	 there	 is	 a	 large	 forward	presence	of	Norwegian-controlled	ships	around	the	globe	 at	 all	 times.	 This	 facilitates	 the	 process	 of	identifying	 suitable	 ships	 well	 placed	 (from	 a	geographical	and	practical	standpoint)	for	strategic	transport	on	short	notice.		Reaction	times	are	also	short	due	to	lack	of	red	 tape	and	uncomplicated	procedures.	After	 the	Shipowners’	Association	has	received	a	task	and	the	required	 ship(s)	 have	 been	 identified,	 phone	 calls	are	 made	 to	 shippers	 to	 request	 the	 ships	 be	redirected	 and	used	on	behalf	 of	 the	 government.	Time-saving	standard	contracts	exist	for	dry	cargo,	while	 a	 corresponding	 standard	 contract	 for	tankers	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	 being	 prepared.	 The	Shipowners’	 Association	 can	 thus	 place	 a	 request	directly	 to	 the	shipper	controlling	 the	most	useful	ships	without	tedious	tendering	processes.	In	short,	a	 high	 level	 of	 situational	 awareness,	 established	liaisons	between	 shippers,	 the	Armed	Forces,	 and	the	 Government,	 coupled	 with	 direct	 access	 to	 a	large	number	of	available	ships,	are	factors	that	help	reduce	 reaction	 time	 and	 facilitate	 a	 flexible	Norwegian	addition	to	US	surge	sealift	capacity.		A	 somewhat	 different	 advantage	 of	 using	Norwegian-controlled	 vessels	 for	 sealift	 purposes	relates	 to	 insurance.	 Almost	 all	 Norwegian-controlled	ships	are	insured	by	the	mutual	insurer	DNK,	 which	 provides	 war	 cover	 for	 shipping	 and	offshore	 industry	 affected	 by	 war,	 terrorism,	 or	piracy.	 What	 is	 special	 about	 DNK	 is	 that	 it	 is,	according	to	the	association	itself,	the	only	provider	in	 the	 world	 of	 insurance	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 war	between	major	powers.	The	normal	procedure	is	for	all	insurances	to	automatically	be	terminated	in	the	event	 of	 a	 major	 powers	 war,	 but	 DNK	 offers	 an	extended	 cover	 for	 30	 days	 with	 a	 maximum	aggregate	limit	of	USD	one	billion.35	This	means	that	ships	 covered	 by	 DNK	 are	 the	 only	 ones	 that	 can	operate	with	insurance	in	a	war	where	the	US	faces	China	or	Russia.	While	 this	extended	war	cover	 is	
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available	 to	 most	 Norwegian-controlled	 ships,	 it	does	not	apply	automatically	and	its	costs	are	likely	to	 be	 high.	 The	 insurance	 is,	 however,	 meant	 to	reduce	insecurity	while	awaiting	a	Norwegian	state	guarantee	to	come	into	place.		In	order	for	the	advantages	discussed	above	to	work	as	 intended,	 the	client—in	 this	case,	both	the	Norwegian	Government	and	the	USTRANCOM—must	be	ready	to	voice	its	need	in	a	clear	and	simple	manner	and	 to	 confide	 in	 the	 shippers	 to	 find	 the	best	practical	solutions.	For	hierarchical	militaries,	this	may	be	challenging,	as	this	is	simply	not	the	way	decision-making	 works	 within	 military	organizations.	At	the	same	time,	the	Armed	Forces	have	to	take	much	higher	security	precautions	at	all	stages	of	civil–military	interaction	due	to	concerns	with	operational	security.	Shippers	may	not	always	have	 the	 potential	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 safest	 way	possible	unless	there	is	close	cooperation	with	the	military	 end-user.	 As	 long	 as	 procedures	 are	 kept	simple	 and	 red	 tape	 is	 minimized,	 there	 is	 great	untapped	 military	 potential	 in	 the	 Norwegian	shipping	sector.		This	 suggestion	 is	 for	 an	 arrangement	whereby	 Norwegian	 ships	 would	 be	 used	 for	operations	 inside	 the	 NATO	 area,	 preferably	 to	reinforce	 Europe.	 However,	 once	 practical	arrangements	 have	 been	 made	 and	 trust	 is	established,	cooperation	between	USTRANCOM	and	the	shippers	could	be	 taken	advantage	of	 in	other	circumstances	 as	 well.	 If	 the	 US	 would	 need	 to	supplement	 in-house	 sealift	 capacity	 in	 other	theaters,	 such	 as	 in	 a	 potential	 operation	 in	 the	Pacific	 Ocean,	 Norwegian	 shippers	 could	 be	approached.	 Some	 would	 probably	 hesitate,	perhaps	 due	 to	 commercial	 relations	 with	 China,	but	others	would	contribute.		There	 are,	 however,	 some	 obstacles	 to	Norwegian	ships	contributing	to	US	sealift.	The	DoD	is	required	by	a	series	of	policy	directives	and	laws	to,	as	far	as	possible,	rely	on	US-flagged	vessels	for	sealift.	 The	 purpose	 of	 such	 requirements	 is	 to	protect	 a	 strategically	 important	 industry	 and	 to	guarantee	a	certain	degree	of	patriotic	motivation	that	 will	 make	 sure	 ships	 actually	 carry	 out	 the	intended	voyages	and	not	refuse	to	deliver	cargo	in	war	zones.36	While	the	USTRANSCOM	has	extensive	experience	using	foreign	transport	ships	for	sealift	purposes,	US	 ships	 are	not	 only	 clearly	 preferred,	but	there	seems	to	be	a	certain	level	of	distrust	with	respect	to	foreign	ships.	In	a	Senate	hearing	in	April	2018,	 General	 Darren	 W.	 McDew,	 Commander,	USTRANSCOM,	 for	 example,	 warned	 that	 if	 the	
sealift	situation	continued	to	deteriorate,	US	Forces	may	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 foreign-flagged	 ships	 for	sustainment.	 The	 general	 further	 pointed	 to	Operation	Desert	Shield,	when,	out	of	192	foreign-flagged	 vessels,	 13	 refused	 to	 enter	 the	 area	 of	operations,	 thus	delaying	 resupply	 to	US	 troops.37	The	 issue	 of	 US	 loyalty	 is	 hence	 a	 concern	 if	 and	when	 USTRANCOM	 needs	 to	 scramble	 additional	sealift	capacity	from	the	spot	market.	Given	that	US	authorities,	for	practical,	legal,	and	security	reasons,	prefer	US-flagged	and	US-owned	vessels	manned	by	mainly	 US	 mariners,	 relying	 on	 Norwegian	 ships	may	not	be	the	optimal	solution,	but	it	may	very	well	be	 the	 second	 best	 option,	 especially	 concerning	loyalty	and	reliability.		
What Would It Take?  The	 fact	 that	 US	 sealift	 capacity	 currently	 is	alarmingly	low	should	be	regarded	as	a	challenge	to	all	NATO	countries.	Norway,	a	small	NATO	member	but	a	major	shipping	power,	depends	on	US	support	to	defend	its	territory	in	the	event	of	war.	It	should	therefore	 initiate	 discussions	with	 the	US	 on	 how	Norway	could	contribute	 to	ensuring	US	ability	 to	deploy	forces	far	from	home	should	the	need	arise.	USTRANCOM	 would	 benefit	 from	 premediated	agreements	with	a	close	ally	for	sealift	support.	Not	only	would	it	help	solve	the	close-to-medium	term	problem	of	how	to	muster	the	required	tonnage,	it	would	be	unlikely	to	require	a	change	in	US	laws	or	regulations,	 as	 the	 agreement	 would	 not	 be	 for	Norwegian	ships	to	substitute	US	ships,	but	strictly	to	supplement	them	in	the	event	of	a	major	crisis	or	war.		 The	 Norwegian	 merchant	 fleet	 has	 a	 long	tradition	 of	 supporting	 allied	 operations	 and	 is	 a	considered	 a	 key	 component	 in	 the	 nation’s	 total	defense.	What	 is	 needed	 first	 is	 political	 initiative	and	the	commitment	to	assume	the	costs	when	the	agreement	 is	 activated.	 Second,	 should	 a	 bilateral	agreement	for	sealift	support	be	signed	between	the	two	countries,	tabletop	exercises	that	test	routines	and	communication,	as	well	as	the	mere	problem-solving	 ability	 of	 the	 fleet,	 would	 likely	 better	prepare	both	the	shippers	and	the	end-users	for	a	Norwegian	 contribution	 to	 US	 sealift.	 Security	arrangements	 would	 necessarily	 also	 be	 worked	out	on	a	general	basis	 in	 such	an	agreement.	This	could	prove	challenging,	as	the	US	Navy	signaled	in	2018	 that	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 major	 war,	 the	 Navy	would	 not	 have	 resources	 to	 escort	 US	 sealift	vessels.38	Importantly,	any	bilateral	discussions	on	
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such	a	contribution	should	include	the	shipowners’	representatives	from	the	start.		Finally,	 one	 of	 the	 challenges	 to	 this	proposal	 may	 be	 political	 resistance	 toward	bilateral	 agreements	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 agreement	under	the	official	NATO	umbrella.	Some	may	argue	that	 agreements	 that	 do	 not	 encompass	 a	 large	number	 of	 member	 states	 in	 fact	 undermine	 the	unity	of	the	NATO	alliance,	and	that	initiatives	such	as	 the	 one	 suggested	 here	 belong	 under	 NATO	authority.	 Yet,	 bilateral	 agreements	 to	 carry	 out	particular	 functions	 are	 not	 only	 commonplace	within	 the	 NATO	 structure,	 but	 they	 are	 also	 key	enablers	to	the	day-to-day	workings	of	the	alliance.	
All	 NATO	 nations	 should	 welcome	 a	 bilateral	agreement	between	Norway	and	the	US	that	allows	Norwegian	 commercial	 ships	 to	 provide	 much-needed	 US	 sealift	 capacity.	 Such	 an	 agreement	would	not	be	beneficial	to	Norway	or	the	US	alone.	Rather,	 it	would	 serve	 all	 of	NATO	by	helping	 the	biggest	military	 power	within	 the	 alliance	 remain	potent—and	by	that,	increase	its	ability	to	react	to	threats	facing	its	European	allies.	Most	importantly,	perhaps,	 it	 would	 make	 the	 rapid	 deployment	 of	superior	 US	 conventional	 fighting	 power	 more	viable	 and	 thus	 significantly	 improve	 its	 inherent	deterring	effect.																										
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